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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of access to microfinance on consumption inequality using panel 
data of 6080 households available from a randomized evaluation conducted by Banerjee et al. 
(2013) in 104 slums in Andhra Pradesh, India. We find that access to microcredit exacerbates 
consumption inequality both at the slum-level and the household-level. Further decomposition of 
inequality indices shows that this difference in consumption inequality is predominantly driven by 
expenditure on non-food items. However, once all households across treatment and control slums 
have equal access to microcredit in the long-run, the disparity in consumption inequality between 
treatment and control slums disappears. Our results also suggest that larger loan size and higher 
number of loan cycles completed by older microcredit borrowers do not cause any significant 
divergence in consumption inequality across treatment and control households. These results imply 
need for targeted livelihood support programmes for those who cannot participate in microcredit 
programmes.  
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Does Access to Microfinance Affect Consumption Inequality? Evidence from a Randomized 
Controlled Trial in Andhra Pradesh, India 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Microfinance as a potential poverty alleviation tool has made tremendous progress in terms 
of outreach across the globe over the last few decades. By the end of 2010, there were 3,652 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) serving more than 200 million microcredit clients across 
nations (Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2012).1 In 2006, Muhammad Yunus of 
Grameen Bank was awarded Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his pioneering work on group 
based lending model of microcredit to the rural poor in Bangladesh. Microfinance has also 
received considerable attention of development planners and social researchers in recent years. 
Existing evaluation studies of microfinance programmes typically examine impact of 
microcredit on borrowers’ consumption, income; business creation and/or profits; and other 
development outcomes namely health, education, and women empowerment. While success of 
microcredit in achieving some of its stated objectives-enabling clients to smooth consumption, 
alleviation of poverty, better health and education, empowering women, etc- remains a 
contentious topic of research, a careful review of existing literature reveals that no systematic 
study has been done so far to examine impact of access to microfinance on consumption 
inequality. This paper fills this particular void in the literature. We examine impact of access to 
microfinance on consumption inequality using panel data of 6080 households available from a 
randomized evaluation conducted by Banerjee et al. (2013) in 104 slums in Andhra Pradesh, 
India.  
Microcredit directly alleviates credit constraint faced by poor households who virtually 
have no collateral to pledge for borrowing from formal financial institutions like commercial 
banks, cooperative banks, etc. Hence, provisioning of microcredit leads to financial deepening 
                                                 
1 We use microfinance and microcredit interchangeably in this paper though strictly speaking they are not 
synonymous. Microfinance is a broad gamut of financial services which beside credit include insurance and savings as 
well. 
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which has implications for inequality. Existing literature on financial deepening and its impact 
on income inequality find mixed results (Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2002; Beck et al., 2004; Kai 
and Hamori, 2009a). Thus, it is imperative to examine impact of microfinance on inequality as 
well. Ahlin and Jiang (2008) theoretically argue that microcredit reduces income inequality in 
the long-run. Studies that empirically examine impact of microcredit on inequality also find 
mixed results (Copestake, 2002; Cuong et al., 2007; Mahajabeen, 2008; Kai and Hamori, 
2009b). However, these studies lack empirical rigour and their results may not be robust 
enough because the underlying methodology fails to control for potential biases which may 
affect impact estimates in either direction, positive or negative. To reiterate, no study has been 
conducted that systematically and rigorously examines the impact of access to microfinance on 
consumption inequality. Therefore, this paper extends existing literature by examining impact 
of access to microfinance on consumption inequality using panel data on a large number of 
households available from a randomized controlled trial (Spandana trial henceforth) in 
homogeneous neighborhoods (slums henceforth) of Hyderabad city in Andhra Pradesh, India.2 
In 2005 the group-based small loan product offered by Spandana was randomized at the slum-
level. The comparison slums- where Spandana was not allowed to open branches- in Spandana 
trial were not counterfactual in the true sense of the term as other MFIs had started lending in 
these slums. However, ‘the probability of receiving an MFI loan was still 8.8 percentage points 
(48 per cent) higher in treatment areas than in comparison areas (27.1 per cent borrowers in 
treated areas versus 18.3 per cent borrowers in comparison areas)’ after 15 to 18 months since 
Spandana started its branch expansion programme in the treatment slums.3 Three years after 
the intervention started in 2005, the probability of borrowing from an MFI was the same in 
                                                 
2 Spandana is an Andhra Pradesh based MFI. 
3 Banerjee et al. (2013) p3 
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treatment and control slums but ‘households in treatment groups had larger loans and had been 
borrowing for a longer time period.’4   
Our approach in this paper has several advantages. First, we use data on a large number of 
households across 104 slums in the city of Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh, India. Hence, we are 
able to capture heterogeneity to a large extent both at the household-level and slum-level. 
Second, the advantage of using data from a randomized controlled trial (RCT) is that it allows 
us to control for selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity.5 Put differently, ‘RCTs allow us 
to estimate what would have happened without the intervention under study.’6 Randomization 
ensures that, on average, treatment slums (with access to microcredit) are comparable with 
control slums (without access to microcredit) in terms of several observable characteristics that 
potentially matter for determining participation in microcredit programme and hence its 
outcomes. Third, this paper uses data for a large number of households over a long period of 
time7.  Thus, our study can capture some of the dynamics of access to microcredit that emerge 
only in the medium-run or long-run.  
We find that access to microcredit exacerbates consumption inequality both at the slum-
level and the household-level. Further decomposition of inequality indices shows that this 
difference in consumption inequality is predominantly driven by expenditure on non-food 
items. However, once all households across all treatment and control slums have equal access 
to microcredit in the long-run, microfinance seems to have no statistically significant impact on 
consumption inequality. Our results also suggest that larger loan size and higher number of 
loan cycles completed by older microfinance borrowers do not cause any divergence in 
inequality across treatment and control households. We also find that enhanced access to 
                                                 
4 Ibid. p4 
5 Microcredit borrowers are not directly comparable with non-borrowers for the fact that the former self-select to 
participate in microcredit program. 
6 Karlan et al. (2009), p 168 
7 The original evaluation study followed a typical household on average for 3 to 3.5 years (Banerjee et al., 2013, p 3). 
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microcredit impacts consumption inequality differently across treatment and control 
households at various percentiles of monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical motivation 
and briefly reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the design of the randomized 
evaluation conducted by Banerjee et al. (2013). Section 4 explicates the empirical model. 
Section 5 provides information on the datasets used for our analysis. Section 6 presents the 
main results and Section 7 concludes.  
2. Empirical  motivation and related literature 
The empirical motivation for this study comes from the existing literature on microfinance 
and consumption which can be broadly divided into two broad strands of literature. One strand 
of literature examines the extent to which microfinance helps poor households in smoothing 
consumption. MFIs extend microloans to poor households to help them start a small enterprise 
and/or in taking up an income generating self-employment activity. It is believed that if poor 
women are able to secure a source of income then eventually in the long-run they are in a 
better position to smooth consumption as well. Moreover, there is evidence which suggests that 
money being fungible, funds borrowed from MFIs for productive investment purposes can also 
partly be used for meeting consumption needs (Zeller 1999; Dichter, 2006; Johnston and 
Morduch, 2008, Banerjee 2013). However, existing studies that examine the extent to which 
microfinance has facilitated consumption smoothing using experimental data find mixed 
evidence (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Karlan and Zinman, 2009; Roodman and Morduch, 2009; 
Crepon et al., 2011). In this context, however, we must bear in mind that in absence of any 
microfinance program, households in a typical slum can smooth consumption in several other 
ways: precautionary saving (Paxson, 1992; Dupas and Robinson, 2008); liquidation of asset 
held in the form of cattle (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Fafchamps et al., 1998); use child 
labor (Jacoby 1994; Dehejia and Gatti, 2002); social institutions like marriage (Rosenzweig 
and Stark, 1989); social capital (Grootaert, 1998; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003) and keeping 
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credit reserve in which case borrowers borrow less than their credit limit (Diagne et al., 1998).  
There is no reason, a priori, to believe that these means to smooth consumption are accessible 
in different degrees by households across treatment and control slums. The other strand of 
literature examines impact of microcredit on average consumption of microcredit borrowers. 
Since microcredit gives direct access to credit, one can hope to see a positive impact of 
microfinance on consumption expenditure of microfinance clients. However, based on the 
randomized evaluation of the microfinance program mentioned above, Banerjee et al. (2013) 
find ‘no difference in average consumption’ across treatment and control slums. This is not an 
unusual finding as microevaluations of similar microcredit programmes conducted elsewhere 
such as Crepon et al. (2011) and Attanasio et al. (2011) find no significant impact of 
microcredit on consumption in rural Morocco and Mongolia respectively. A few other quasi-
experimental studies find positive impact of access to credit on consumption (Kaboski and 
Townsend, 2005; Gertler et al., 2009). But, this is an average outcome which does not tell us 
anything about the spread of the consumption distribution across households in treatment and 
control slums. Inequality itself merits in depth analysis since it has implications for economic 
growth (Mirrlees, 1971; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Alesina and Perroti, 1996) and 
investment in human capital (Galor and Zeira, 1993). Ahlin and Jiang (2008), using a 
theoretical model, argue that microcredit reduces income inequality in the long-run. Studies 
that empirically examine impact of microcredit on inequality report mixed results (Copestake, 
2002; Cuong et al., 2007; Mahajabeen, 2008; Kai and Hamori, 2009b). However, these studies 
lack empirical rigor and their results may not be robust enough because the underlying 
methodology fails to control for potential biases that may affect impact estimates in either 
direction, positive or negative.8  
                                                 
8 Copestake (2002) compare existing micro credit borrowers with “pipeline clients”, that is, the clients who have been 
selected by the MFI as eligible to borrow following the same criteria but are yet to borrow from the MFI and finds 
evidence of income polarization in Zambia. Cuong et al. (2007) use fixed-effect regression method to analyze the 
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Our objective in this paper is to fill this gap in the existing microfinance literature. We 
examine inequality in terms of consumption expenditure both at the slum and household level 
across treatment and control slums. Since slums were randomly selected, we find no evidence 
of divergence in inequality measures across treatment and control slums prior to the branch 
expansion by Spandana in treatment slums. In other words, the level of consumption inequality 
was the same both at the slum-level and household-level across treatment and control before 
the initiation of the microcredit intervention by Spandana. However, advent of microfinance 
program can affect consumption inequality either favorably or adversely for the following 
reasons and this makes analysis of consumption inequality particularly interesting. First, one of 
the key results of the theoretical model developed by Banerjee et al. (2013) is that households 
in treatment slums with access to credit are ‘more likely to buy the durable, but [their] first-
period total non-durable consumption and even total consumption may be higher or lower. 
[Their] second period non-durable consumption will be lower.’ Thus, the net impact of access 
to microfinance on average consumption and consumption inequality remains ambiguous, and 
therefore examining consumption inequality across treatment and control slums can shed 
further light on this. Second, if more and more households with access to microcredit tend to 
spend approximately the same average consumption per capita then consumption inequality 
will tend to diminish. Third, access to microfinance can spurt creation of micro enterprises that 
yield high returns (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008). These micro enterprises generate 
employment opportunities for other households in the same neighborhood which can actually 
facilitate a greater number of households in securing income and hence in smoothing 
consumption. Therefore, we may expect that access to microcredit can lead to reduced 
                                                                                                                                                                
impact of micro credit on measures of inequality such as Gini coefficient, Theil’s indices etc in Vietnam and find 
supportive evidence of microfinance reducing inequality. Mahajabeen (2008) examines impact of micro credit on 
inequality in a computable general equilibrium framework using calibration technique in Bangladesh and finds 
evidence of micro credit leading to reduced inequality. Using cross-country data, Kai and Hamori (2009a) find 
evidence of “equalizing effect” of micro credit on income distribution. 
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variability in consumption per capita in treatment slums as compared to control slums. 
Moreover, examination of consumption inequality at the slum level among a pool of potential 
microcredit clients can be a good starting point for analyzing the general equilibrium 
implications of access to microcredit in the long run (Buera et al., 2011).  
Access to microfinance can also potentially impact consumption distribution through its 
impact on clients’ risk-bearing capacity. There is theoretical evidence which suggests that in 
less developed economies with imperfect capital market, ability to take up entrepreneurship 
increases with risk-bearing capacity wherein access to consumption credit positively affects 
risk-bearing capacity (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990). Hence, the ‘able but poor agents may never 
get to exercise their entrepreneurial skills.’9 Morduch (1995) provides corroborative empirical 
evidence to this end and argues that ‘the effect of risk on production (and consequent 
efficiency loss) can be large, especially with respect to choices made by most poor (and most 
vulnerable) households.’10 Therefore, access to microcredit can have differential impact on 
consumption behavior for households that differ in terms of vulnerability and hence their 
different risk tolerance limits. In Peru, Pearlman (2007) finds that relatively more vulnerable 
potential entrepreneurs are less likely to participate in microfinance program than their less 
vulnerable counterparts even after controlling for their skills and wealth. These households 
choose to invest in low-yield-low-risk projects while their less vulnerable counterparts are 
more likely to invest in high-yield-high-risk projects by participating and borrowing from 
microfinance program. Thus, we may expect to see a change in the dispersion of the 
consumption distribution in treatment slums but the direction of change will precisely depend 
on the proportion of the two groups of households discussed above in the overall pool of 
potential borrowers. We may however expect to see not much change in the distribution of 
consumption in control slums.  
                                                 
9 Eswaran and Kotwal (1990), p 481. 
10 Morduch (1995), p 108. 
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Finally, it is also possible that households say in the lower percentiles (in terms of per-
capita consumption expenditure) are more credit constrained. Thus, advent of microfinance can 
have maximum discernible impact on the spread of the consumption distribution in the lower 
percentiles of treatment slums vis-à-vis control slums than in the higher percentiles even after 
controlling for other factors that have potential bearings on consumption. Hence, it is 
imperative to examine consumption inequality in treatment group vis-à-vis control group at 
various percentiles of the per capita consumption expenditure. We do this percentile based 
analysis in this paper to fill this gap in the existing literature on microfinance and consumption 
inequality.  
3. Experimental Design
11
  
In India, microfinance has proliferated rapidly over the last few decades and number of 
MFIs has also gone up manifold. Andhra Pradesh, a southern state, has been a major hub of the 
microfinance movement in India where by November 2010, MFIs were serving more than 6 
million clients (Microcredit Summit Campaign Report, p5). Spandana is an MFI in India with a 
very strong presence in Andhra Pradesh. In 2005, Spandana identified around 120 slums12 in 
Hyderabad, the capital city of the state of Andhra Pradesh (erstwhile), for opening new 
branches.13 These slums were identified for two reasons. First, slums had good number of 
potential microcredit clients with low level of income. Second, these slums had no presence of 
other MFI and the baseline survey, as discussed later, conducted in these slums confirmed this. 
Out of these 120 originally identified slums, 16 slums were dropped from the branch expansion 
plan as those were deemed unfit for microcredit programme due to high concentration of 
migrant workers. The remaining 104 slums were ideal for branch expansion and were used by 
                                                 
11 This section borrows heavily from Banerjee et al.(2013). 
12 These slums are “permanent settlements with concrete houses and some public amenities (electricity, water, etc.)” 
and the population in such  slums ranges between 46 to 555 households (Banerjee et al., 2013, p6) 
13 A new state called Telengana was created out of Andhra Pradesh in June 2014 and Hyderabad continues to be the 
joint capital of both the states. 
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Banerjee et al. (2013) for the evaluation study. Half of the pre-identified 104 slums were 
randomly assigned to treatment, that is, Spandana was allowed to open branches in these 
slums. The remaining slums were assigned to control where Spandana did not open any 
branch. A baseline survey was conducted in these slums at the household-level to glean 
information on ‘household composition, education, employment, asset ownership, expenditure, 
borrowing, saving’, and business activities before randomly assigning slums into treatment and 
control.14 The baseline information was used for initial stratification of 104 slums. Slums were 
grouped into pairs for randomization based on ‘average per capita consumption and per-
household debt.’15 Banerjee et al. (2013) clearly show that treatment and control slums were 
indeed similar or homogeneous in terms of demographic, financial and entrepreneurial 
characteristics. This gives us enough assurance that the randomization was proper and free of 
any systematic bias. 
 The first comprehensive follow-up household survey (Endline1 henceforth) with 6850 
households was conducted in all areas between August 2007 and April 2008, 15 to 18 months 
after the setting up of MFI branches by Spandana in treatment slums. In order to decide the 
sampling frame for Endline1, a comprehensive census was conducted in all the slums in early 
2007. The census showed that MFI borrowing was lower than expected in treatment slums. 
Therefore, households who were highly likely to borrow from an MFI were selected for the 
Endline1 in both treatment and control slums.16 Moreover, households who borrowed from 
Spandana were oversampled. We correct our results for this oversampling to make our results 
fairly representative of the population parameters. It must be noted that other MFIs had started 
their lending operations in both treatment and control slums by the time Endline1 began. 
However, a statistically significant difference of 8.8 percentage points in probability of 
                                                 
14 Banerjee et al.(2013) p7. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Banerjee et al. (2013) identify these households based on their duration of stay in the slum (at least three years and 
above) and whether the households have at least one women aged between 18 and 55. 
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receiving an MFI loan still prevailed between treatment and control slums. In other words, at 
Endline1 treatment slums had higher access to microcredit than control slums.   
On completion of Endline1, Spandana was allowed to open branches in control slums. 
Meanwhile, other MFIs also opened their branches in both treatment and control slums. The 
next comprehensive follow-up survey (Endline2 henceforth) was conducted two years later 
during 2009-2010. In 2009, Endline2 data showed that ‘MFI lending overall was almost the 
same in the treatment and the control group’ and fraction of households who had borrowed 
from any MFI in treatment slums (33.7 per cent) was almost equal to that in control slums 
(33.1 per cent).17 Since MFI lending started later in control slums, Endline2 data also revealed 
the fact that households in treatment slums on average had been ‘borrowing for longer than 
those in the control group.’ Consequently the average loan cycle of the former was higher than 
that of the latter and the difference was statistically significant. Endline2 data also suggested 
that households in treatment slums had larger (by Rs. 2,344) loan size compared to the 
households in control slums and the difference was statistically significant. Thus, ‘the key 
differences between treatment and control slums at [E]ndline 2’ were ‘length of access to 
microfinance’ and the consequent ‘larger loans’. Endline2 survey also possibly captured some 
of the effects of access to microcredit that emerge only in the long-run. To reiterate, our 
objective in this paper is to examine the impact of access to microfinance per se on 
consumption inequality and not necessarily that of microcredit offered by any particular MFI.              
3.1 Spandana’s microcredit programme: an overview 
Spandana offers microcredit in groups which consists of six to ten women. Women in the 
age group of 18 to 59 with valid identification and residential proof and having own house are 
considered to be eligible to join a microcredit group. Group members are jointly liable for the 
repayment of the loans given to the group. These groups are formed by women on their own. 
                                                 
17 38.5% households borrowed from an MFI in treatment slums and 33.1% of households did the same in control 
slums (see Table 3 Panel B of Banerjee et al., 2013). 
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The size of the first loan is Rs. 10,000 which is equivalent to $ 1000 at 2007 purchasing power 
parity (PPP)-adjusted exchange rates (World Bank, 2007 as cited in Banerjee et al., 2013, p.6). 
The repayment tenure of such loan is 50 weeks and the rate of interest charged by Spandana is 
24 per cent per annum. On repaying the loan received in first cycle, the groups are eligible to 
borrow upto Rs. 20,000 in the next cycle. ‘Spandana does not determine loan eligibility by the 
expected productivity of the investment’ (Banerjee et al., 2013: 6) and hence money being 
fungible, women clients can potentially use part of the loan amount to meet consumption 
needs. This enables microcredit clients to smooth consumption, and hence examination of 
consumption inequality becomes pertinent and particularly interesting.    
3.2 What else changed between Endline1 and Endline2? 
As mentioned previously, Endline1 and Endline2 were conducted during 2007-2008 and 
2009-2010 respectively. Thus, the time gap between the revisit of the same household for the 
two waves of survey was approximately two years. In these two years no significant or 
catastrophic event took place unevenly across treatment and control slums that could 
potentially change the lending and borrowing patterns of households in these slums. Thus, the 
treatment and control slums remain comparable both in Endline1 and Endline2. At this 
juncture, we would like to mention that the infamous ‘AP microfinance crisis’ erupted in 
October 2010 (CGAP, 2010) after the completion of Endline2, and hence we can safely assume 
no significant impact of the crisis on Endline2 survey results.  
We next turn to the discussion on changes in some economic indicators. Banerjee et al. 
(2013) find that average household consumption in original control slums increased from Rs 
.7,662 in Endline1 (2008) to Rs 11,497 in Endline2 (2010) even after adjustment for price 
movements between Endline1 and Endline2. The authors also find similar growth in business 
activities (from 34 per cent in Endline1 to 42 per cent in Endline2), savings bank account 
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holding (from 82 per cent in Endline1 to 85 per cent in Endline2) and health insurance uptake 
(from 12 per cent in Endline1 to 76 per cent in Endline2) in control slums.18        
4. Empirical model 
In this paper we analyze consumption inequality at two levels: slum-level and household-
level. It must be noted here that in this paper we are interested in examining consumption 
inequality among a pool of households who are potential participants of microcredit 
programmes. Households in treatment slums and those in control slums were homogeneous in 
terms of several observable characteristics. The only difference that remained between them 
was in terms of their access to microcredit. First, we estimate kernel densities of MPCE 
(median adjusted) of both treatment and control groups at the slum-level and household-level 
to examine the difference in the spread of the distribution graphically. However, we cannot 
comment much on inequality by looking at the kernel densities, and hence slum-level and 
household-level analyses are formally done as follows. 
4.1 Slum-level analysis 
We measure consumption inequality at the slum-level in terms of three indicators: coefficient 
of variation (CV), Gini coefficient and Theil index.19 These indices are computed based on 
MPCE. These measures belong to the Generalized Entropy (GE) class proposed by Theil 
(1967).20 Also, use of these measures has several advantages. First, these measures are scale 
independent and hence we do not adjust MPCE for price movements between Endline1 (2007) 
and Endline2 (2009). Second, these measures meet some of the desirable axioms of a ‘good’ 
measure of inequality.21 Third, these measures are decomposable into factor components. Gini 
coefficient varies between zero (perfect equality) and unity (perfect inequality) and Theil index 
can vary between zero (perfect equality) and logn (perfect inequality), where ‘n’ is the size of 
                                                 
18 This rapid rate of growth of health insurance penetration was perhaps due to the expansion of government funded 
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojna (RSBY) health insurance program in the study areas. 
19 For computational formulas for these inequality indices, see Appendix-A. 
20 For e.g. GE( α =1) = Theil’s measure, where α is the weight given to the distances between MPCE at different parts 
of the MPCE distribution. 
21 For e.g. population independence and Pigou-Dalton condition as discussed in Fields (2001, pp 17-18).  
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the population.  For all the three measures, higher the value of the index higher is the level of 
inequality. To measure the impact of access to microcredit on consumption inequality at the 
slum-level we estimate the following regression equation: 
iiii XTreatdummyy εφββ +
′+×+= 10       (1) 
where, yi is the slum-level measure of consumption inequality, Treatdummy is an indicator for 
treatment slums (treatdummy =1 for treatment slums and = 0 for control slums). X is a vector 
of slum-level control variables, calculated at baseline, including MPCE, fraction of household 
heads who are literate, fraction of households who purchased items under Public Distribution 
System (PDS) from ration shops in last 30 days, fraction of households who experienced a 
health shock, and fraction of households with insurance (life, health, and accidents).22 The 
coefficient of interest is β1. We estimate Eq.(1) separately for baseline, Endline1 and Endline2. 
Finally, we test robustness of our findings by using nonparametric bootstrap technique (Efron 
and Tibshirani, 1993).23 Nonparametric bootstrap is used because inferences drawn based on 
such method are ‘asymptotically efficient’ (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993: 395). We conduct 
1000 bootstrap replications, each of original sample size and compute ratio of mean inequality 
in control slums to mean inequality in treatment slums. Inequality is measured in terms of the 
inequality indices previously mentioned, and thus we obtain three ratios: CV-ratio, Gini-ratio 
and Theil-ratio. Therefore, a typical ratio exceeds (is less than) unity if consumption inequality 
in control slums is higher (lower) than that in treatment slums. Finally, we compute 90 per cent 
fully empirical confidence intervals (CI) of the ratios to test statistical significance.  
4.2 Household-level analysis 
                                                 
22 A household suffered a health shock if it had spent Rs 500 or more for treating a sick or injured household member. 
23 For a brief description of bootstrap method see Appendix-B. 
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We analyze household-level inequality across all households in treatment slums vis-à-vis 
households in control slums in terms of two measures: Gini coefficient and Theil index.24 We 
use nonparametric bootstrap technique25 to compute 90 percent fully empirical confidence 
intervals of the ratio of Gini coefficient (Gini-ratio)of treatment households to Gini coefficient 
of control households using 1000 bootstrap replications, each of original sample size. 
Similarly, we compute the ratio for the Theil index (Theil-ratio) between treatment and control 
households. A typical ratio exceeds (is less than) unity if inequality among control households 
is higher (lower) than those among treatment households. We perform the household-level 
analysis separately for baseline, Endline1 and Endline2.  
After comparing levels of inequality across treatment and control households, it is 
imperative to decompose inequality in two ways.26 First, we can ask: what proportion of total 
MPCE inequality is attributable to various constituent expenditure categories? This is a “levels 
question” and hence we term it as levels decomposition. Second, we may ask: how much of the 
difference in inequality between treatment and control is accounted for as a proportion by 
different constituent expenditure categories? This is a “differences question” and hence we 
term it as difference decomposition which is helpful in determining relative importance of 
different expenditure categories in determining inequality differences between treatment and 
control households. For the purpose of decomposition, we divide MPCE into three 
components: monthly per-capita expenditure on cereals, per-capita expenditure on non-cereal 
food items and per-capita non-food expenditure.27 We carry out the source-decomposition 
                                                 
24 Gini coefficient and Theil index are “strongly-Lorenz-consistent” (Fields, 2001: p. 31) 
25 Use of bootstrap technique for analyzing inequality is not new in the related literature. For example, Mills and 
Zandvakili (1997) use bootstrap technique to examine inquality trends in the United States. Athanasopoulos and Vahid 
(2003) use bootstrap method to analyze changes in income inquality in Australia between 1986 and 1999. For a more 
technical discussion on use of bootstrap in inequality measurement, see Biewen (2002). 
26 See Fields (2003) for a detailed discussion on levels and difference decomposition. 
27 Cereals consist of rice, maize, wheat, bajra etc. Non-cereal food items are pulses and pulse based products, milk and 
milk products, edible oil, vegetables, fruits and nuts, egg, fish and meat, other food items such as sugar, salt, spices, 
tea, coffee, processed foods, etc. excluding food items consumed outside home, meals and snacks consumed outside 
home, drinking water etc. Non-food items are intoxicants (pan/tobacco etc.), fuels, monthly expenditure on 
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analysis following the method suggested by Shorrocks (1982). Using Shorrocks (1982) 
decomposition framework, we argue that “natural decomposition rule”-which presupposes that 
the index of MPCE inequality is a weighted sum of individual MPCE’s- fails to determine 
factor inequality weights uniquely. Shorrocks (1982) resolves this problem of non-uniqueness 
of factor inequality weights by imposing a few additional restrictions on the properties of the 
inequality index in question namely, normalization for equal factor contributions and two-
factor symmetry.28 These two restrictions are sufficient to ensure uniqueness of factor 
inequality weights regardless of the measure of inequality used. In other words “unique 
decomposition” rule as discussed in appendix C is independent of the choice of inequality 
measure. 
Finally, we go one step further by examining the same ratios for different percentiles of 
MPCE estimated at Endline1. We compute 90 percent empirical confidence intervals of Gini-
ratio and Theil-ratio for different percentiles of Endline1 MPCE using 1000 bootstrap 
replications, each of original sample size. Since we are interested in relative inequality across 
treatment and control households, we compute 90 per cent empirical confidence intervals of 
the same ratios based on estimated MPCE at Endline2 for the same set of households who were 
in different percentiles based on MPCE at Endline1. This allows us to track the same set of 
households between Endline1 and Endline2, and hence we can capture the dynamic nature of 
consumption inequality between treatment and control households at different percentiles of 
MPCE (based on Endline1 estimates).     
5. Data 
                                                                                                                                                                
miscellaneous good and services like telephone and electricity, cinema, theatre, school and tuition fees, school books 
and other educational expenses (annual), newspapers, magazines, medical expenses (non-institutional), medical 
expenses (annual institutional) toilet items, clothing (annual), footwear (annual), durable goods (annual) regular 
conveyance costs, house rent and other payments, informal fees. 
 
28 Shorrocks (1982) imposes four other conditions: continuity, factor symmetricity and population symmetricity, 
independence of the level of disaggregation, and consistency. 
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In this paper we primarily use Endline1 and Endline2 data available from Spandana trial 
conducted by Banerjee et al. (2013) to create a panel dataset. Additionally, we use the baseline 
data only to examine the situation in terms of consumption inequality prior to the intervention 
both at the slum-level and household-level across treatment and control groups. The baseline 
survey was administered in all sample slums in 2005. In 100 slums out of 120 slums, 20 
households were surveyed per slum; in the remaining 20 slums, 40 households were surveyed 
per slum, and thus in total 2800 households were surveyed in baseline. In each slum 
households were randomly selected conditional on having a woman aged between 18 and 55 
years.  
In 2007, Endline1 was conducted in both treatment and control slums 15 to 18 months after 
Spandana started opening branches in treatment slums back in 2005. In each slum on average 
65 households randomly selected from the sampling frame discussed previously in Section 3 
were surveyed using a structured questionnaire and in total 6850 households were enumerated 
across 104 slums. The same set of households was surveyed again in 2009-2010 during 
Endline2 using a structured questionnaire very similar to the one administered in Endline1. 
Availability and getting consent of households for participation in surveys during repeated 
visits become a challenge in the creation of a panel dataset. Enumeration of households that are 
available for participation in repeated surveys brings in the issue of ‘attrition bias’ as known in 
the parlance of evaluation literature (Duflo et al., 2006). Fortunately in Spandana trial ‘the re-
contact rate at Endline2 for household initially interviewed at Endline1 was very high, at 89.9 
per cent in the treatment group and 90.2 per cent in the control group’ (Banerjee et al. 2013: 8). 
Banerjee et al. (2013) further show that average characteristics along most dimensions, of 
households who could not be enumerated in Endline2 did not differ statistically significantly 
from those of enumerated households in both treatment and control slums29. However, for 
                                                 
29 For more information on attrition rates, see Banerjee et al. (2013) pp 8-9. 
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slum-level analysis, we dropped the slums in which less than 30 households were enumerated 
across both treatment and control slums. Thus, we have 87 slums in total across both waves of 
the survey. By combining Endline1 and Endline2 datasets we created a balanced panel dataset 
of 5,287 households across these 87 slums for our analysis. Out of these 5,287 households, 
2,718 and 2,559 households were in treatment and control slums respectively. We also use 
household-level data for the same 87 slums available from the baseline survey discussed 
previously. 
In both Endline1 and Endline2 surveys, fairly detailed data on household composition, 
education, household assets, consumption expenditure, savings, borrowing, health and other 
shocks, and business activities were collected.30 Since we use consumption expenditure data 
extensively in this paper, we describe it in detail next as follows. Data on consumption 
expenditure was collected at the household level by interviewing the household member who 
was most informed about household expenses. The respondent was asked to report expenses 
incurred by the household in the last month on food items (such as cereals, pulses, oil, spices, 
etc.), fuel, and on other miscellaneous goods after excluding business expenses, if any, on such 
items. Annual data on educational expenditure, medical expenses, expenditure on festival and 
seasonal clothing, footwear expenses, and gifts were also collected. We compute monthly 
consumption expenditure by adding all monthly expenses wherever reported and one twelfth of 
the total expenditure on goods and services purchased annually.          
6. Results 
Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 show the kernel densities of MPCE (median adjusted) for 
treatment and control slums for Endline1 and Endline2 respectively. By looking at the densities 
we can conclude that distribution of MPCE across treatment and control slums has changed 
between Endline1 and Endline2. Graphically, it appears that distribution of MPCE of treatment 
slums has higher spread in comparison with that of control slums. Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 
                                                 
30 To know more about definitions of variables such as business see appendix of Banerjee et al. (2013). 
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show the kernel densities of MPCE (median adjusted) for treatment and control households for 
Endline1 and Endline2 respectively. The kernel densities of treatment and control households 
by and large overlap in both Endline1 and Endline2. However, we cannot comment much on 
inequality based on these densities because kernel densities have drawbacks especially when 
applied to long-tailed distributions. 
 [INSERT FIG 1.1 and 1.2 HERE]  
[INSERT FIG 2.1 and 2.2 HERE]  
6.1 Slum-level results 
The summary statistics of some of the slum-level variables of interest from the baseline 
survey are reported in Panel A of Table 1. Average MPCE of treatment slums and controls 
slums in baseline were Rs.1,012 and Rs.978 respectively. The standard test of difference in 
means (results not reported in the table) reveals that these differences are not statistically 
significant. Treatment and controls slums are otherwise balanced in terms of most of the 
observed characteristics namely, average fraction of household heads who are literate, average 
family size, average fraction of households borrowing for consumption, average fraction of 
households availing PDS, average fraction of households having insurance, average fraction of 
households who experienced a health shock, average land ownership, average size of the 
livestock, and average number of businesses per household.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Estimation results of Eq.(1) are reported in Table 2. The baseline results are reported in 
Panel A. Panel B and Panel C show results for Endline1 and Endline2 respectively. In Panel B, 
the point estimate of the coefficient of the treatment dummy is positive and statistically 
significant at 5 and 10 per cent level of significance for Gini Coefficient and Theil index 
respectively; implies that in terms of Gini Coefficient and Theil Index, treatment slums on 
average had higher inequality by 0.02 points and 0.04 points respectively. Thus, enhanced 
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microcredit access seems to cause statistically significant rise in consumption inequality in 
treatment slums. At this juncture, it is worth looking at baseline results in Panel A which shows 
that the coefficient of the treatment dummy is statistically insignificant for all the three 
measures of inequality. Hence, consumption inequality at the slum-level was the same prior to 
the microcredit intervention by Spandana, thanks to randomization. Next, we turn to Endline2 
results. In Panel B of Table 2, we find that none of the coefficients of the treatment dummy is 
statistically significant. Thus, we do not find any statistically significant difference in 
consumption inequality measured in terms CV, Gini Coefficient, and Theil Index across 
treatment and control slums. Hence, our results suggest that once all slums had equal access to 
microcredit, consumption inequality became equal across treatment and control slums. Put 
differently, larger loan size and higher loan cycles enjoyed by households who had been 
borrowing from MFIs in treatment slums in Endline2 did not matter for consumption 
inequality.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
We test robustness of our findings using bootstrap technique as elaborated in Section 4.1 
and the results are presented in Table 3. The baseline results are reported in Panel A. Panel B 
and Panel C show results for Endline1 and Endline2 respectively. Panel A shows that during 
baseline, mean values of all the three ratios were close to unity and the 90 per cent fully 
empirical confidence intervals include unity for all the three ratios. Thus, we do not find any 
evidence of divergence in terms of consumption inequality across treatment and control slums 
during baseline survey. In Panel B, the bootstrap means of CV-ratio, Gini-ratio and Theil-ratio 
are all less than unity. More importantly, 90 per cent fully empirical confidence intervals of 
CV-ratio, Gini-ratio and Theil-ratio do not include unity and the upper limit of all the three 
ratios are less than unity; implies that treatment slums had higher consumption inequality than 
control slums in Endline1. Coming to Endline2 results in Panel C, we find that all the 90 per 
 21 
cent fully empirical confidence intervals include unity and the bootstrap estimates of means of 
all the three ratios are close to unity. Hence, we do not find any statistically significant 
difference in consumption inequality across treatment and control slums in Endline2.       
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
6.2 Household-level results 
Average characteristics of treatment households and control households across all the 
slums during baseline are presented in Panel B of Table 1. In baseline, average household-level 
MPCE was Rs. 1,044 and Rs. 985 for treatment and control households respectively but the 
difference was not statistically significant (mean difference results are not reported in the 
table). Treatment and control households on average are approximately equal in terms of other 
observed characteristics namely, literacy status of the household head, family size, whether 
borrowing for consumption, availing PDS, having insurance, whether experienced any health 
shock, land ownership, size of the livestock, and number of businesses per household.  
Before using Gini coefficient and Theil index for inequality comparison between treatment 
and control groups, we examine the Lorenz curve of MPCE of these two groups. From Figure 
3.1 it is evident that the Lorenz curve of the control group lies somewhere above and never 
goes below the Lorenz curve of the treatment group in Endline1. Thus, in Endline1 the MPCE 
distribution of the control group “Lorenz-dominate” the MPCE distribution of the treatment 
group (Fields, 2001: p.20).  In Figure 3.2, we find evidence of “Lorenz-coincidence” in 
Endline2 as the Lorenz curve of control group and that of treatment group more or less 
overlap. Results from our subsequent analysis of inequality using Gini coefficient and Theil 
index accord with these graphical findings. The bootstrap estimation results at the household-
level for Gini-ratio and Theil-ratio are presented in Table 4. Panel A shows estimation results 
for the baseline. Panel B and Panel C show estimation results for Endline1 and Endline2 
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respectively. In Panel A, the bootstrap mean of Gini-ratio and Theil-ratio are respectively 0.92 
and 0.78. The 90 per cent fully empirical confidence intervals of both Gini-ratio and Theil-ratio 
include unity; implies no statistically significant divergence between treatment and control 
households in terms of consumption inequality in baseline. In Panel B, the bootstrap mean of 
Gini-ratio and Theil-ratio are respectively 0.93 and 0.81. The 90 per cent fully empirical 
confidence intervals of both Gini-ratio and Theil-ratio exclude unity and the upper limits of the 
ratios are less than unity but very close to unity. Thus, we find some weak evidence of 
increased consumption inequality at the household-level across all treatment slums. In other 
words, increased access to microcredit seems to be associated with higher consumption 
inequality at the household-level. We now turn to Endline2 estimation results in Panel C of 
Table 4. Although bootstrap estimates of Gini-ratio (1.04) and Theil-ratio (1.08) exceed unity, 
the 90 per cent empirical confidence intervals of both the ratios include unity. Thus, we do not 
find any evidence of statistically significant difference in consumption inequality across 
treatment and control households in Endline2 during which all households had equal access to 
microcredit. In other words, at the household-level also, we find that larger loan size and 
higher loan cycles enjoyed by households who have been borrowing from MFIs in treatment 
slums for longer time do not matter for consumption inequality.        
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
6.3  Inequality Decomposition by Factor Components  
We report results of levels decomposition of inequality in Table 5. Consumption inequality 
among households across treatment and control slums is predominantly driven by non-food 
expenditure and more so in case of treatment group. Share of non-food expenditure in total 
consumption inequality is as high as 87 percent and 81 percent for treatment and control 
households respectively in Endline1. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
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Turning to Endline2, we find that non-food expenditure continues to be the predominant 
contributor to consumption inequality. The factor weight of non-food expenditure dwindles to 
76 percent from 87 percent for treatment households and the same dwindles to 79 percent from 
81 percent for control households. After non-food expenditure, non-cereal food expenditure is 
the second important contributor to consumption inequality. Its factor share is 10.5 percent and 
14 percent for treatment and control households respectively in Endline1. Factor share of non-
food expenditure remains the second highest even in Endline2. Non-food expenditure’s shares 
in total consumption inequality are 19 percent and 16 percent for treatment and control 
households respectively in Endline2. Coming to share of expenditure on cereals, we find that 
its factor weight never exceeds 5 percent for treatment and control households in both Endline1 
and Endline2. 
We report results of difference decomposition analysis in Table 6 for Endline1 only. Since 
we do not find any statistically significant difference in consumption inequality across 
treatment and control households, difference decomposition analysis for Endline2 is not 
warranted. Factor shares in difference decomposition analysis are dependent on the measure of 
inequality used (see appendix C). Hence, we carry out difference decomposition analysis for 
both difference in consumption inequality measured in terms of Gini Coefficient and Theil 
Index across treatment and control households and report the results separately in Table 6. 
Interestingly in Endline1, we find that factor shares of expenditure on cereals and non-cereal 
food items are both negative. Thus, expenditures on cereals and non-cereal food items play an 
equalizing role in mitigating consumption inequality differences across treatment and control 
households. However, expenditure on non-food items predominantly drives the observed 
consumption inequality differences between treatment and control households. Factor shares of 
non-food expenditure in difference decomposition in terms of Gini Coefficient and Theil index 
are 170 percent and 112 percent respectively. Thus, the inequality augmenting effect of non-
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food expenditure far outweighs the equalizing effect emanating from expenditure on cereal and 
non-cereal food items.         
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
6.4 Percentile Analysis 
In this paper we also examine disparity in consumption inequality across treatment and 
control households at different percentiles of MPCE. 90 per cent empirical confidence intervals 
of Gini-ratio and Theil-ratio computed based on bootstrap replications at various percentiles of 
MPCE at Endline1 are reported in Panel A and Panel B of Table 7 respectively. In Panel A, we 
find that 90 per cent empirical confidence intervals of Gini-ratio for Endline1 (column 1 and 2) 
do not include unity (column 3) for 9 percentiles (namely, 20th, 35th, 40th, 45th, 65th, 70th, 75th, 
80th, and 90th)  out of the 20 percentiles at which such confidence intervals are estimated.  
Moreover, out of these 9 percentiles, the upper limit of the confidence interval was less than 
unity for 6 percentiles (namely, 20th, 35th, 45th, 70th, 75th and 90th) which implies that 
consumption inequality was more pronounced among treatment households compared to 
control households at these percentiles in Endline1. Similar results are found in case of Theil-
ratio as well. Figure 4.1 and 5.1 show Gini-ratio and Theil-ratio and their 90 per cent empirical 
confidence intervals for Endline1 graphically.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
Next we turn to Endline2 results for Gini-ratio in Panel A of Table 7. We find that 90 per 
cent empirical confidence intervals of Gini-ratio for Endline2 (column 4 and 5) include unity 
(column 6) for 19 percentiles (except 75th) out of the 20 percentiles at which such confidence 
intervals are estimated. Qualitatively similar results are obtained in case of Theil-ratio in 
Endline2 as well (Col 6 of Panel B). Thus, our results suggest no statistically significant 
divergence in consumption inequality across treatment and control slums in Endline2 at 
various percentiles of Endline1 MPCE. Figure 4.2 and 5.2 show Gini-ratio and Theil-ratio and 
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their 90 per cent empirical confidence intervals for Endline2 graphically. Two broad 
conclusions can be drawn from this percentile based analysis. First, enhanced access to credit 
impact consumption inequality differently across various percentiles of MPCE and for most 
percentiles it impacts consumption inequality adversely in case of treatment households. 
Second, once all households across treatment and control slums have equal access to 
microcredit, bigger loan size and higher loan cycles have little impact on consumption 
inequality at most of the percentiles of MPCE.  
[INSERT FIG 4.1 and 4.2 HERE]  
[INSERT FIG 5.1 and 5.2 HERE]  
7. Conclusion 
Evaluation studies of microcredit programmes done so far typically evaluate impact of 
microcredit on consumption and other indicators of well being such as, health, education and 
women empowerment, etc. Since microfinance is a credit market intervention which directly 
removes credit constraint faced by poor households in an imperfect credit market, it is 
imperative to examine its impact on consumption inequality among a group of potential 
microfinance participants as well. However, there is dearth of evidence on impact of access to 
microcredit on consumption inequality in the existing literature. This study fills this gap in the 
existing literature.  
In this paper we rigorously analyse impact of access to credit on consumption inequality 
using a large panel dataset of more than 5000 households available from Spandana trial 
conducted by Banerjee et al. (2013). We examine consumption inequality at the slum-level and 
household-level using various broadly accepted measures of inequality: CV, Gini Coefficient 
and Theil Index. There are two main findings of this study. First, we find evidence of enhanced 
access to credit exacerbating inequality both at the household-level and slum-level. This 
finding is similar to what Copestake (2002) finds in terms of income polarization in Zambia. 
Further decomposition of inequality indices shows that the difference in consumption 
 26 
inequality is predominantly driven by expenditure on non-food items. Second, once all 
households have equal access to microcredit in terms of probability of getting a microloan, 
microcredit has no statistically significant impact on consumption inequality. Even larger loan 
size and higher loan cycles do not matter for consumption inequality both at household-level 
and slum-level. The second finding can be perceived as the impact of microcredit on 
consumption inequality in the long-run and hence it is in sharp contrast with the theoretical 
postulate of Ahlin and Jiang (2008). However, it must be noted that we examine inequality in 
terms of MPCE but Ahlin and Jiang (2008) postulate is about income inequality in the long-
run.  
We go one step further to examine impact of access to microcredit on consumption 
inequality at various percentiles of MPCE. Our results suggest that improved access to 
microcredit does impact consumption inequality differently across treatment and control 
households at different percentiles of MPCE. However, we find no statistically significant 
impact of larger loan size and higher loan cycles completed by older microfinance borrowers 
on consumption inequality at different percentiles of MPCE.     
The findings of this paper are based on the panel data available from Spandana trial 
conducted by Banerjee et al. (2013) in Hyderabad slums of Andhra Pradesh in India. It is 
imperative to test external validity of our results using data from some other similar 
randomized controlled trial conducted elsewhere in the world. This could be a potential topic 
of future research.  
An immediate policy implication of our results is this: financial inclusion through 
microcredit may not be enough for mitigating consumption inequality. To achieve this, we 
need targeted livelihood support programmes (e.g. National Rural Livelihood Mission 
(NRLM) launched in 2005 by Government of India, non-government initiatives such as 
Targeting Hard-Core Poor programme of Bandhan in West Bangal as narrated in Banerjee et 
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al. (2010), etc.) for those who are unable to participate in microcredit programmes. Moreover, 
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government at the centre in India tried its best to enact 
Food Security Bill in India. Hence, it will be interesting to examine impact of access to 
microcredit on consumption inequality in a similar randomized controlled setting but after the 
enactment of Food Security Act in India. Microfinance as a potential poverty alleviation tool 
deserves special attention and its general equilibrium impacts on income or consumption 
inequality should be carefully examined for effective policy making.   
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Appendix B: A short note on bootstrap method
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A single inequality index say, Gini coefficient or Theil Index tells us the extent of 
inequality at a given point of time. The ratio between the inequality indices in question computed 
for two different sample groups indicates whether extent of inequality differs across the two 
groups. However, a single point estimate of the ratio does not tell us whether the observed 
difference in inequality across groups, if any, is statistically significant or not. Therefore, it is 
imperative to test the statistical significance asymptotically and thus bootstrap method comes 
handy. The advantage of using bootstrap method is that it does not impose any functional form for 
the underlying distribution of MPCE and therefore the method is applicable whenever samples are 
drawn independently from the population. 
 
Suppose, a random sample of size n is drawn from a completely unspecified probability 
distribution F. Let Iˆ  denotes the point estimate of the inequality measure, I. We generate the 
empirical distribution Fˆ of the inequality measure by drawing random samples of size n  with 
replacement from the original sample such that each sample observation, iy for i = 1(1)n, has 1/n 
probability of being included in the drawn sample. We repeat this procedure B times and thus we 
get B bootstrap samples of size n.  
},......,,{ˆ **2
*
1
b
n
bb yyyF →  for b = 1, 2, ….., B 
We calculate the inequality measure of interest (I), I*b for each sample. Thus, we generate a series 
of values for the inequality measure, 
},......,,{ *2*1* BIII  
The estimated standard error of I*b calculated on the basis of B sample observations mentioned 
above is a consistent estimator of Iˆ , i.e., 
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The αth lower and upper percentiles of the bootstrap distribution of I*b are denoted by blI * and  bhI *  
respectively. Then, the lower and upper percentile values can be used as the boundary values of 
100-2α percent empirical confidence interval for I.32  
 
Suppose, we have two samples of size n1 and n2 drawn from two unspecified probability 
distributions F1 and F2 respectively. Let, )ˆ/ˆ(ˆ 21 IIR =  denotes the ratio between the estimated 
inequality measures for the two samples33. Using bootstrap procedure as described above, we 
generate a series of values of R as, 
}/{ *2
*
1
* bbb IIR =  for b = 1, 2, ….., B 
 
                                                 
31 This description is heavily based on the description of the bootstrap method in Athanasopoulos and Vahid (2003) 
32 α = 0.05, 0.025, 0.005, for conventional levels of significance namely, 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
33 For the purpose of our analysis, sample 1 and 2 can be considered as control and treatment samples respectively. 
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Thus, the 100-2α percent empirical confidence interval for R is given by 
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where, blR
*  and bhR
* denote αth lower and upper percentiles of the bootstrap distribution of R*b 
respectively. If this empirical confidence interval does not include unity then we conclude that the 
estimated ratio between the indices of inequality across two groups is statistically significant.  
 
The above description holds good when sample units have no weight attached to it. 
However, in our case Spandana borrowers were oversampled and hence different sample units had 
different weights, },{ ** bi
b
i wy  for b =1, 2, ….,B and i =1(1)n. We adjusted our inequality measure 
computation and subsequent confidence interval computation following the method suggested by 
Biewen (2002).  
 
Appendix C: Decomposition of Inequality into Factor Components 
 
A. Levels decomposition 
 
Suppose there are n households and y represents the vector of MPCE of the n households. 
Thus, y ={y1 y2 y3 …..yn} where yi denote MPCE of the i
th household.  
 
Let there be K expenditure categories which we call factor components such that MPCE of the ith 
household (yi) can be decomposed into K components: yi1, yi2,……,yiK. In our case we have three 
MPCE factor components namely, monthly per-capita expenditure on cereals, per-capita 
expenditure on non-cereal food items and per-capita non-food expenditure and hence K = 3. 
Thus we get, 
∑
=
=
=
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k
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1
                                      (1) 
We define the following: 
sk = relative factor inequality weight which shows proportion of total consumption inequality that 
is contributed by the kth expenditure category. 
Therefore, ∑
=
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Let I(y) denotes the measure of inequality such that  
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Therefore by natural decomposition rule, 
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However, these factor components are not unique due to non-uniqueness of the factor weights i.e., 
ai’s. In fact, Shorrocks (1982: p. 202) shows that “the contribution of any factor expressed as a 
proportion of total inequality can be made to give any value between plus and minus infinity!” 
To circumvent this problem of non-uniqueness or “multiplicity” of potential decomposition rules, 
Shorrocks (1982) imposes the following conditions to the properties of I(y):34 
 
Normalisation for equal factor distributions: This condition implies that if all households spend 
the same amount on the k’th factor, then the share of inequality accounted for by that factor should 
be zero. 
 
Two factor symmetry: If there are two factor components such that K=2 and distribution of one of 
the factors is simply a permutation of the other factor, then both factors should get the same factor 
weight in the decomposition. 
By imposing the above mentioned conditions on the properties of  I(y), Shorrocks (1982) shows 
that the unique decomposition of inequality index  I(y) is given by35 
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 where, 
 yk  denote the distribution (y1k, y2k, ………, ynk) of expenditure on k
th item across n households.  
µ is the mean of y and e=(1 1 1 1….1) 
 
)(2 yσ  and kρ  represent variance of y and correlation coefficient between yk and y respectively. 
Evidently, ∗ks is “independent of the choice of inequality measure” and 1
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B. Difference decomposition 
 
We are comparing difference in inequality between two groups: treatment (T) and control (C). 
I(·)j denote the measure of inequality for group-j where j = T, C and we denote difference in 
inequality between treatment and control by ∆I such that, 
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Let us denote the contribution of factor-k to ∆I by )]([ ⋅Π Ik  such that, 
I
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⋅∗−⋅∗
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∗∗ )()(
)]([ ,, for all k =1,2,…..K………..(2) 
and ∑ =Πk k 1 
It is evident from (2) above that )]([ ⋅Π Ik  depends on the choice of inequality measure, I(·). 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Shorrocks (1982) calls these conditions assumptions. 
35 Shorrocks (1982) imposes four other conditions: continuity, factor symmetricity and population symmetricity, 
independence of the level of disaggregation, and consistency. 
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Figure 1.1: Kernel Density Plots (Endline1) 
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Figure 1.2: Kernel Density Plots (Endline2) 
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Source: author’s calculation 
 
Figure 2.1: Kernel Density Plots 
(Endline1) 
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Figure 2.2: Kernel Density Plots 
(Endline2) 
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Source: author’s calculation 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Lorenz curve of Endline1  
(Household-level) 
Figure 3.2: Lorenz curve of Endline2 
(Household-level) 
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Fig 4.1: Endline1 graph (90% CI) 
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Fig 4.2: Endline2 graph (90% CI) 
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Source: author’s calculation 
 
Fig 5.1: Endline1 graph (90% CI) 
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Fig 5.2: Endline2 graph (90% CI) 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of Some Variables of Interest 
 Panel A: Slum-level 
  Baseline 
  Control Treatment Total 
 Household head literate (%) 60.7 62.1 61.41 
  (15.61) (12.25) (13.94) 
 Average family size 5.08 5.16 5.12 
  (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) 
 Avg MPCE 977.71 1012.46 995.28 
  (233.69) (250.26) (241.43) 
 Household borrowing for consumption (%) 10.64 12.9 11.78 
  (9.65) (13.31) (11.63) 
 Household purchased items from PDS shops (%) 60.58 58.01 59.28 
  (19.61) (19.69) (19.58) 
 Household having insurance (%) 23.55 22.78 23.16 
  (13.12) (11.43) (12.23) 
 Household spent more than Rs 500 due to health shock (%) 35.23 41.87 38.6 
  (21.84) (14.31) (18.61) 
 Average land ownership (in acres) 0.46 0.7 0.5 
  (0.49) (0.76) (0.64) 
 Average size of livestock(birds+large animals) 0.31 0.35 0.33 
  (0.67) (0.89) (0.78) 
 Average number of business 1.24 1.15 1.19 
  (0.38) (0.23) (0.32) 
 N 43 44 87 
     
 Panel B: Household-level 
  Baseline 
  Control Treatment Total 
 Household head literate (Yes/No) 0.63 0.64 0.63 
 Family size 5.04 5.1 5.08 
  (1.67) (1.78) (1.73) 
 MPCE 985.29 1044.27 1014 
  (831.3) (1074.3) (960.73) 
 Household borrowing for consumption (Yes/No) 0.14 0.17 0.16 
 Household purchased items from PDS shops (Yes/No) 0.57 0.58 0.57 
 Household having insurance (Yes/No) 0.24 0.23 0.24 
 Household spent more than Rs 500 due to health shock (Yes/No) 0.37 0.42 0.40 
 Land ownership (in acres) 2.22 2.72 2.50 
  (3.79) (6.90) (5.67) 
 Size of livestock(birds+large animals) 0.18 0.20 0.19 
  (1.19) (1.20) (1.19) 
 Number of business 1.17 1.13 1.15 
  (0.45) (0.40) (0.42) 
 N 1220 1220 2440 
     Note: In Panel A Standard deviations are in parentheses; In Panel B Standard deviations are in parentheses for 
non-binary variables 
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Table 2: Slum-level Inequality 
    Dependent variable 
  CV Gini Theil 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Baseline    
     
Treatment  0.92 -0.0004 -0.002 
  (5.70) (0.014) (0.024) 
Mean in control 64.76 0.28 0.17 
  (35.56) (0.096) (0.15) 
N  87 87 87 
R
2
  0.56 0.62 0.59 
     
Panel B: Endline1    
     
Treatment  8.47 0.02** 0.04* 
  (5.79) (0.01) (0.02) 
Mean in control 63.17 0.28 0.15 
  (22.12) (0.043) (0.068) 
N  87 87 87 
R
2
  0.21 0.32 0.23 
     
Panel C: Endline2    
     
Treatment  -0.058 -0.004 -0.0002 
  (3.28) (0.006) (0.011) 
Mean in control 63.33 0.30 0.16 
  (14.89) (0.034) (0.049) 
N  87 87 87 
R
2
  0.25 0.37 0.31 
          
     
Notes:     
1. The table presents the coefficient of the "treatment" dummy in a regression of each 
dependent variable on the treatment dummy (with control variables mentioned in the text). 
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
3. Results are weighted to account for oversampling of Spandana borrowers 
4. * significant at 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level 
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Table 3: Bootstrap results (slum-level) 
    Panel A: Baseline   
  90% CI 
 Mean Lower limit Upper limit 
CV-ratio 0.94 0.76 1.14 
 (0.11)   
Gini-ratio 0.97 0.85 1.09 
 (0.07)   
Theil-ratio 0.93 0.66 1.26 
 (0.18)   
    
  Panel B: Endline1  
  90% CI 
 Mean Lower limit Upper limit 
CV-ratio 0.85 0.72 0.98 
 (0.075)   
Gini-ratio 0.91 0.85 0.97 
 (0.035)   
Theil-ratio 0.77 0.62 0.93 
 (0.092)   
    
  Panel C: Endline2  
  90% CI 
 Mean Lower limit Upper limit 
CV-ratio 0.99 0.90 1.09 
 (0.058)   
Gini-ratio 1.00 0.96 1.05 
 (0.027)   
Theil-ratio 0.98 0.87 1.12 
 (0.070)   
        
Notes:     
1.Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses  
2. Number of replications = 1000   
3. Each ratio = average of control/average of 
treatment  
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Table 4: Household-level Inequality 
    
Panel A: 
Baseline   
  90% CI 
 Mean Lower limit Upper limit 
Gini-ratio 0.92 0.82 1.02 
 (0.059)   
Theil-ratio 0.78 0.58 1.02 
 (0.136)   
    
  
Panel B: 
Endline1  
  90% CI 
 Mean Lower limit Upper limit 
Gini-ratio 0.93 0.87 0.99 
 (0.037)   
Theil-ratio 0.81 0.65 0.99 
 (0.105)   
    
  
Panel C: 
Endline2  
  90% CI 
 Mean Lower limit Upper limit 
Gini-ratio 1.04 0.99 1.09 
 (0.029)   
Theil-ratio 1.08 0.95 1.23 
 (0.085)   
        
Notes:     
1.Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses 
2. Number of replications = 1000 
3. Each ratio = average of control/average of treatment 
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  Table 5: Inequality Decomposition of Levels 
  Factor shares (in %) 
Expenditure  
Categories Endline1 Endline2 
  Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Cereals 1.85 4.34 4.86 4.87 
Non-cereal food  10.56 14.09 19.4 16.11 
Non-food 87.59 81.57 75.74 79.02 
Total 100 100 100 100 
                               Notes: 
 
Table 6: Inequality Decomposition of Differences 
  Factor shares (in %) 
Expenditure  
Categories Endline1 
  ∆Gini ∆Theil 
Cereals -32.33 -8.41 
Non-cereal food  -37.90 -3.98 
Non-food 170.23 112.39 
      
Total 100 100 
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Table 7: Inequality at different percentiles of MPCE 
      Panel A: Gini-ratio     
 Endline1: 90% CI  Endline2: 90% CI  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MPCE Percentile (Endline-1) Lower limit Upper limit CI Includes unity Lower limit Upper limit CI Includes unity 
5 0.87 1.32 Yes 0.78 1.12 Yes 
10 0.86 1.06 Yes 0.76 1.32 Yes 
15 0.83 1.00 Yes 0.90 1.40 Yes 
20 0.81 0.97 No 0.55 1.00 Yes 
25 0.84 1.02 Yes 0.70 1.03 Yes 
30 0.96 1.16 Yes 0.98 1.40 Yes 
35 0.79 0.94 No 0.84 1.56 Yes 
40 1.02 1.26 No 0.90 1.23 Yes 
45 0.77 0.92 No 0.85 1.20 Yes 
50 0.84 1.02 Yes 0.90 1.36 Yes 
55 0.95 1.18 Yes 0.74 1.04 Yes 
60 0.96 1.19 Yes 0.84 1.41 Yes 
65 1.13 1.36 No 0.96 1.27 Yes 
70 0.78 0.92 No 0.92 1.42 Yes 
75 0.79 0.95 No 1.11 1.57 No 
80 1.07 1.28 No 0.89 1.28 Yes 
85 0.98 1.21 Yes 0.93 1.30 Yes 
90 0.81 0.99 No 0.85 1.20 Yes 
95 0.86 1.04 Yes 0.77 1.20 Yes 
100 0.61 1.07 Yes 0.75 1.02 Yes 
      Panel B: Theil-ratio     
 Endline1: 90% CI  Endline2: 90% CI  
MPCE Percentile (Endline-1) Lower limit Upper limit CI Includes unity Lower limit Upper limit CI Includes unity 
5 0.62 1.60 Yes 0.57 1.23 Yes 
10 0.75 1.12 Yes 0.57 2.49 Yes 
15 0.68 1.00 Yes 0.82 2.48 Yes 
20 0.66 0.94 No 0.18 0.93 No 
25 0.71 1.04 Yes 0.41 1.04 Yes 
30 0.93 1.33 Yes 1.04 2.29 No 
35 0.61 0.87 No 0.63 3.58 Yes 
40 1.03 1.54 No 0.78 1.53 Yes 
45 0.59 0.85 No 0.71 1.48 Yes 
50 0.70 1.03 Yes 0.79 2.19 Yes 
55 0.92 1.39 Yes 0.52 1.04 Yes 
60 0.91 1.40 Yes 0.57 2.39 Yes 
65 1.28 1.86 No 0.89 1.55 Yes 
70 0.62 0.86 No 0.82 2.56 Yes 
75 0.62 0.91 No 1.22 2.63 No 
80 1.15 1.67 No 0.78 1.65 Yes 
85 0.97 1.45 Yes 0.83 1.61 Yes 
90 0.66 0.97 No 0.71 1.53 Yes 
95 0.74 1.06 Yes 0.53 1.61 Yes 
100 0.35 1.09 Yes 0.56 1.08 Yes 
              
Notes:  Total number of treatment households = 2718; total number of control households = 2559; CI: Confidence interval ;  
Each ratio = average of control/average of treatment 
 
